1
MARKETING
NEUROMARKETING: HOW NEUROSCIENCE CAN HELP GET INTO THE
MINDS OF THE CONSUMERS. A STUDY ON COMMERCIAL BRANDS.
José Paulo Neves Correia Marques dos Santos, jpsantos@ismai.pt, Investigation Unit in Human
Development and Psychology (Unidep), ISMAI - Superior Institute of Maia, Portugal / Applied
Economy Department II, Economy Faculty, Coruña University, A Coruña, Spain
Fernanda Sofia Quintela da Silva Brandão, sofiabrandao@netcabo.pt, Radiology Department,
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Unit, São João Hospital, Oporto, Portugal
Daniela Vasconcelos Ribeiro Santos Seixas, dseixas@med.up.pt, Institute of Histology and
Embryology, Faculty of Medicine, Oporto University, Portugal / Neuroradiology Department of São
João Hospital, Oporto, Portugal
1
MARKETING
NEUROMARKETING: HOW NEUROSCIENCE CAN HELP GET INTO THE
MINDS OF THE CONSUMERS. A STUDY ON COMMERCIAL BRANDS.
José Paulo Neves Correia Marques dos Santos, jpsantos@ismai.pt, Investigation Unit in Human
Development and Psychology (Unidep), ISMAI - Superior Institute of Maia, Portugal / Applied
Economy Department II, Economy Faculty, Coruña University, A Coruña, Spain
Fernanda Sofia Quintela da Silva Brandão, sofiabrandao@netcabo.pt, Radiology Department,
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Unit, São João Hospital, Oporto, Portugal
Daniela Vasconcelos Ribeiro Santos Seixas, dseixas@med.up.pt, Institute of Histology and
Embryology, Faculty of Medicine, Oporto University, Portugal / Neuroradiology Department of São
João Hospital, Oporto, Portugal
ABSTRACT
An evolutionary perspective suggests that the Frontal Lobe in the brain had an important role in
constructing the actual human social groups. Broca’s area, inside the Frontal Lobe, contributes to the
language and reading processes. Looking to History, it is possible to make a parallel between the first
ideograms and the commercial brands’ logos of the present. The parallel could be prolonged and the
reading act and the logos interpretation could share similar processes within the Frontal Lobe. On the
other hand, Neuroscience suggests that the Frontal Lobe may be the place where other social cognitive
capabilities take place, as for example mentalizing, future planning or decision-making. All these
considerations about the Frontal Lobe led to the present work. We idealized a paradigm to investigate
how the human brain reads, interprets and uses the symbols and the meaning of commercial brands,
using Functional Magnetic Resonance.
Key words: Neuromarketing, Commercial brands, Frontal Lobe, Emotions, Social Brain.
1 INTRODUCTION
The accident of Phineas Gage occurred in September 13, 1848, may still have consequences today within the
Marketing discipline. Phineas Gage was working with explosives in a railway construction when an accidental
explosion projected the tamping iron that he was using. The tamping iron penetrated his head, in a bottom to top
direction, entering in the left cheekbone and exiting by the top-left part of the frontal bone. Surprisingly, Phineas
Gage survived, although with severe damage of the left section of his Frontal Lobe (Ratiu, Talos, Haker,
Lieberman, & Everett, 2004). He didn’t lose most of his normal capabilities: he continued to be able to maintain
a conversation, his movements were not impaired, and inclusively he managed to go back to work. But, as
reported by his doctor and colleagues, he wasn’t the same Phineas: now he was irreverent, indifferent about his
fellows, gross, indulgent, and remarkably fitful and inconsequent. These cues led António Damásio and coworkers
to hypothesize that the Frontal Lobe could be important for mood and emotion and then to decisionmaking
and future planning (Damásio, 1994).
In an evolutionary perspective, it is widely accepted that there was a tremendous growth of the brain during
evolution to Homo sapiens sapiens, most particularly in the Homo lineage. Analyzing separately the evolution of
the different brain lobes, it was the Frontal Lobe that registered the biggest proportional enlargement (Holloway,
1995; Bruner, Manzi, & Arsuaga, 2003; Burns, 2006). Took in consideration alone, this fact does not prove
anything, but, together with neurological examples like the case of Phineas Gage, it provides cues for
investigating the special development of the species Homo sapiens sapiens. There is then a non-negligible
probability that the Frontal Lobe lies behind the social complexity of the Homo sapiens sapiens.
2
The large and complex social groups of the species Homo sapiens sapiens use symbols and signs to
communicate. Some of these signs and symbols evolved into a knowledge known as writing (Pinker, 1995). The
first utilized symbols were ideograms, which are graphic symbols that, by themselves, represent an idea.
Ideograms were used within the earlier logographic writing systems, as the hieroglyphs in old Egyptian.
However, in eastern Asia, logographic writing systems are still are used, namely the traditional Chinese system
(Tan, et al., 2000). Not surprisingly, the act of reading induces activations in several regions in the brain, and in
particular in a region of the Frontal Lobe known as Broca’s area (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; Matthews, et al.,
2003). Commonalities in brain activations are also found between words and pictures (Vandenberghe, Price,
Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996). Considering these arguments, there is an evident link between the
development of the Homo lineage, the growth of the Frontal Lobe and the invention of writing and reading
meaningful symbols.
A special class of these meaningful symbols that are used within social context makes the bridging to the
Marketing discipline: commercial brands. The parallel between commercial brands and the first ideograms is
conspicuous: both are graphical representations that embody an idea. To understand how consumers read,
interpret and use these symbols, the commercial brands, the Frontal Lobe should be minutely inquired. This is
the main goal of the present work.
When individuals make social transactions, they usually do not use rational, full cognitive, conscientious and
explicit strategies. By the contrary, individuals tend to utilize implicit automated, ready-made short-cuts
(Pelzmann, Hudnik, & Miklautz, 2005). If it was not like this, the so complex social processing would quickly
overflow any individual processing capacity, which could paralyze the human system. Again in an evolutionary
perspective, this transformation probably happened early in evolution, If it was not, the case human beings might
not have survived until the present day, as they would have been easy targets for predators. So, is likely that
humans mostly act by implicit rather than explicit strategies within the social context, i.e. without full cognitive
awareness (Critchley, et al., 2000). In spite of this, most of the studies that investigate the brain use explicit
paradigms, for example to form impressions of people and objects (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2004; Mitchell,
Macrae, & Banaji, 2005), or other social research problems (Adolphs R. , 2003). But is this how people form
impressions of others or objects? Common experience shows that individuals form impressions of their peers
implicitly, and implicitly use this information when trading (Critchley, et al., 2000). Our objectives were to
investigate these issues, focusing in the Frontal Lobe in particular, and also attempt to determinate if explicit or
implicit processing of commercial brands is in fact different.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) has emerged in the last decade as the preferred technique in
Social Neuroscience studies. Contrary to other techniques used in Neuroscience research in humans, fMRI is
non-invasive, which means that the risks inherent to this technique are minimal (Huettel, Song, & McCarthy,
2004). FMRI does not use either ionizing radiation or chemical substances. FMRI employs strong magnetic
field, which, to date, albeit the millions of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans that are made every day,
never was connected with any kind of detrimental long term effects. FMRI has a good spatial resolution (up to 1
mm), which means that it is able to image the individualized structures that compose the brain are and it allows
to differentiate which ones are active and which ones are not active during the performance of a certain task.
FMRI relies on the response of the blood vessels that follows brain electrical activity, and as such its temporal
resolution is not excellent, but at least identical to other popular neuroimaging methods like Positron Emission
Tomography (PET). Other relative disadvantages are the physical noise (much attenuated with the use of
auricular protection), the more or less long data acquisitions and the artificial research environment, away from
the reality of everyday life. Considering fMRI’s advantages and disadvantages, it is actually one of the best
imaging methods to innocuously visualize brain function in humans in vivo. Original articles using fMRI as a
methodology have been growing in numbers each year in the worldwide scientific literature, especially in the
field of cognitive neuroscience, which will be also the core of the present study.
2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 Participants
The participants were 6 healthy male and 6 healthy female volunteers, right handed, native Portuguese speakers
with neither history of neurological nor psychiatric disturbances (mean age 28,4 years, 5,4 s. d.; mean schooling
16,2 years, 1,5 s. d.). Informed consent was obtained in all cases. A safety form for MRI was filled by every
participant and discussed with a Neuroradiologist and a Radiographer. This research project was approved by the
Ethics Committee of São João Hospital, Oporto, Portugal.
3
2.2 Behavioral procedures
To explore our hypothesis, we designed a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) task that encompassed
commercial brands as stimulus, made-up by two paradigms (runs).
In the first run (implicit) volunteers were only instructed to look at the screen during the scanning; nothing was
said regarding what they are about to see (commercial brands). Then, in the explicit run, we instructed the
volunteers to make mental assessments of the brands they would see. The order of the runs was crucial: being
first the implicit task, we expected to capture the volunteers’ free will and avoid any anticipation.
The paradigm was the same for both runs and consisted of a mixed design experiment – block and event-related
– where as baseline we used words without emotional content, over a black background. These words were
determiners, conjunctions, prepositions or adverbs. Importantly, we didn’t use any nouns or verbs that could
evoke emotions, objects or actions. As stimulus, we employed commercial brands, with the logos and colors that
were characteristic for each and every one in everyday life. The baseline period was equal to the stimulus period,
30 seconds long. Within each 30 seconds period, 5 slides were visually displayed, 6 seconds each. The slide set
was then composed by 16 baseline periods and 16 stimulus periods, totaling 160 slides.
For the selection of the commercial brands to use as stimulus, 147 students of the Superior Institute of Maia
(ISMAI), Portugal, filled in an inquiry with 237 commercial brands. The purpose of this inquiry was to decide on
the most well known brands. The brands supposedly with emotional content (chosen by the students either with a
“negative” or a “positive” valence) were intermingled pseudo-randomly with the brands with supposedly nonemotional
content (those that received an assessment of “indifferent”).
Between the MRI scanning runs, the volunteers filled in an inquiry that had the exactly same sequence of
commercial brands that was within the slide set they were about to visualize inside the MRI scanner. For each
brand, the volunteers chose between four states: “unknown”, “negative”, “indifferent”, and “positive”. In this
way, before the explicit run, they trained the brands’ assessments which were then required to be repeated
through the scanning session. These inquiries were used afterwards to construct the basic shapes for the eventrelated
analysis.
2.3 Image acquisition
A whole brain anatomical structural scan was acquired for each volunteer in a Siemens® Trio high field (3 Tesla)
MRI scanner, using a T1-weighted MPRAGE protocol (256 x 256 matrix, FOV = 256 mm, 3.0 mm axial slices).
Functional images were acquired using T2*-weighted EPI (TR = 3000 ms, TE = 30 ms, 64 x 64 matrix, FOV =
192 mm, 3.0 mm axial slices). Gradient field mapping was additionally acquired for image quality control.
A trained Neuroradiologist reviewed all the anatomical scans. No incidental findings were found.
2.4 Image analysis
FMRI data processing was carried out using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 5.90, part of FSL
(FMRIB's Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl).
The following pre-statistics processing was applied; motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister,
Brady, & Smith, 2002); slice-timing correction using Fourier-space time-series phase-shifting; non-brain
removal using BET (Smith, 2002); spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 5mm; grand-mean
intensity normalization of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor; highpass temporal filtering
(Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma=30.0s). Time-series statistical analysis was
carried out using FILM with local autocorrelation correction (Woolrich, Ripley, Brady, & Smith, 2001).
Registration to high resolution structural and/or standard space images was carried out using FLIRT (Jenkinson
& Smith, 2001; Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002).
Higher-level analysis was carried out using FLAME (FMRIB's Local Analysis of Mixed Effects) stage 1 only,
i.e., without the final MCMC-based stage (Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2003; Woolrich, Behrens,
Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2004).
Z (Gaussianised T/F) statistic images were thresholded using clusters determined by Z>2.3 and a (corrected)
cluster significance threshold of P=0.05 (Worsley, 2001).
4
Interesting structures were isolated using ROIs - Region-of-Interest. The masks to pre-threshold the ROIs were
made based on the atlases “Harvard-Oxford Cortical Structural Atlas” and “Harvard-Oxford Subcortical
Structural Atlas” which accompany FSL View v3.0, part of FSL 4.0.
3 RESULTS
Along the scans, the twelve participants made implicit and then explicit cognitive assessments of commercial
brands. Four possible valences were available for the explicit assessments: “unknown”, “negative”, “indifferent”,
and “positive”. As the aim of this work is to understand how the Frontal Lobe distinguishes between indifferent
commercial brands from those that induce preferences, only the ratings “indifferent” and “positive” were
considered for analysis.
In Table 1 and Table 2 are listed the results of the activations, respectively produced under positive and
indifferent rating, within the implicit run. In Table 1, from the dorsal to the ventral Front Lobe, the biggest
cluster (#1) occupies the margins of the Longitudinal Fissure, starting in the Juxtapositional Lobule Cortex and
descending until the Frontal Medial Cortex, in the base of the brain. Here, it “spreads”, laterally and medially to
the Frontal Orbital Cortex (the left is larger) and rostrally to the Subcallosal Cortex. The cluster #2 and the
clusters #3 and #4 are almost mirrored. They occupy the dorso-lateral sections of the Frontal Lobe.
Table 1 – Brain structures activated under positive rating, within the implicit run.
z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
BA
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L/R
Juxtapositional Lobule Cortex
Paracingulate Gyrus
Superior Frontal Gyrus
Frontal Pole
Frontal Medial Cortex
Subcallosal Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
6
8
9
10
11
25
47
6767 5.20 -28 28 22 -10 40 6
#2
R
R
R
R
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
6
46
44
973 3.72 38 32 10 41 12 31
#3
L
L
L
L
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
6
46
44
929 3.67 -50 28 18 -44 15 22
#4 L Middle Frontal Gyrus 8 320 3.78 -28 24 48 -34 18 43
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
In Table 2, the most dorsal cluster (#1), occupies the left margin of the Longitudinal Fissure. Clusters #2 and #3
occupy the ventral brain, the former in both sides of the Longitudinal Fissure and the later laterally on the left
side.
Table 2 – Brain structures activated under indifferent rating, within the implicit run.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
Frontal Pole
Frontal Medial Cortex
Subcallosal Cortex
10
25
481 3.65 -4 52 -18 -3 45 -18
#2 L Frontal Pole 9 331 4.06 -8 68 26 -9 64 25
#3 L Frontal Orbital Cortex 47 301 4.19 -28 32 -18 -31 32 -18
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
5
Comparing Table 1 and Table 2, it is possible to verify that there are common activated structures. It is the case
of Frontal Medial Cortex / Subcallosal Cortex and the left Frontal Orbital Cortex, all in the dorsal portion of the
Prefrontal Cortex. In the ventral but still anterior section of the Prefrontal Cortex, it shares a common part of the
Frontal Pole.
In Table 3 are listed the clusters that are statistically significant when differences between the ratings positive
and indifferent are made, within the implicit run. From the dorsal to the ventral Front Lobe, the biggest cluster
(#1) occupies the left margin of the Longitudinal Fissure, starting in the Precentral Gyrus and descending, by two
separated branches, one until the Frontal Orbital Cortex, and the other until the Pars Opercularis. Cluster #2
occupies the dorso-lateral part of the Prefrontal Cortex.
Table 3 - Brain structures that activated under positive rating but not at indifferent, within the implicit
run.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Frontal Pole
Paracingulate Gyrus
Superior Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Orbital Cortex
6
8
32
9
46
10
47
3649 3.52 -48 4 26 -30 33 22
#2
R
R
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Pole
46
47
11
480 3.45 40 38 -12 44 35 -8
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
Of special relevance, we verified that the left Frontal Orbital Cortex had a region of activation common to both
“positive” and “indifferent” ratings (its rostral area) and another one exclusive to the “positive’ rating (its
anterior area). Activations also exclusive of the “positive” rating were the Paracingulate Cortex and the Inferior
Frontal Gyrus, both its Pars Opercularis and Pars Triangularis.
There were no clusters with statistical significance that activated exclusively in the “indifferent” rating, still
considering the implicit run.
In the explicit run the participants made conscious, explicit, assessments of the commercial brands, which were
previously trained outside the scanner room.
Table 4 and Table 5 list, respectively, the results of “positive” and “indifferent” ratings obtained in the explicit
run. It can be observed in Table 4 that Cluster #1 is composed by two separated branches that involve the ventral
Prefrontal Cortex and the dorsal-frontal-lateral brain, where they weld. One branch that occupies the
Juxtapositional Lobule Cortex and “descends” along the Longitudinal Fissure and then “bends” laterally, until
the ventro-lateral Frontal Pole. The other branch involves the Precentral Gyrus and then the Frontal Orbital
Cortex, where it welds with the first branch. Clusters #2 and #3 are in the right hemisphere in a lateral position,
being cluster #2 more dorsal and cluster #3 more ventral.
In Table 5, Cluster #1 is observed as a complex activation area, composed by two branches (like a V) that
involves the frontal-lateral section of the Prefrontal Cortex, and left hemisphere, and welds dorsally in the
Frontal Orbital Cortex. Cluster #2 is similar to cluster #1, with the difference that it is in the opposite
hemisphere. Cluster #3 occupies the margins of the Longitudinal Fissure in the Paracingulate Cortex.
Comparing Table 4 with Table 5, we verified that the clusters found were very similar, almost superimposing.
This is the case of the Paracingulate Cortex, the left and right Inferior Frontal Gyrus (both the Pars Opercularis
and the Pars Triangularis), the Frontal Operculum and the Frontal Orbital Cortex.
6
Table 4 - Brain structures activated under positive rating, within the explicit run.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
Juxtapositional Lobule Cortex
Paracingulate Gyrus
Superior Frontal Gyrus
Frontal Pole
Frontal Medial Cortex
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
6
8
9
10
11
47
46
13
45
7905 4.62 -42 48 -10 -30 30 13
#2
R
R
R
R
R
Precentral Gyrus
Middle frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Pole
6
9
10
1242 3.90 38 34 12 44 13 31
#3
R
R
R
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
13
10
1068 3.86 30 38 -14 34 36 -10
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
Table 5 - Brain structures activated under indifferent rating within the explicit run.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
6
8
9
46
45
44
13
10
6180 4.99 -46 52 -10 -41 29 10
#2
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
6
8
9
46
45
44
13
10
3573 5.17 32 28 -8 42 30 12
#3 Paracingulate Gyrus
9
32
1158 5.15 -4 18 44 0 28 36
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
In Table 6Table 3 is listed the cluster that is statistically significant when differences between the ratings
“positive” and “indifferent” are considered, within the explicit run. This cluster occupies the ventral-medial
margins of the Longitudinal Fissure.
There were no statistically significant activated clusters exclusive of the “indifferent” rating within the explicit
run.
7
Table 6 - Brain structures that activated under positive rating but not at indifferent, within the explicit
run.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
Frontal Pole
Paracingulate Gyrus
Frontal Medial Cortex
10 341 3.25 -4 56 0 -4 49 -8
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
Comparing the “indifferent” ratings in both runs, implicit and explicit, we observed that clusters #2 and #3
(Table 2) share most of their voxels, i.e. the dorsal part of the Frontal Pole and the anterior part of left Frontal
Orbital Cortex. Besides these common areas, almost all the other activations identified in the explicit run and in
the implicit run are not found to have any correspondence between them (Table 7).
Table 7 - Brain structures that activated in the explicit run but not in the implicit, within the indifferent
rating.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
6
8
9
46
45
44
13
10
4942 4.40 -40 22 -10 -43 28 11
#2
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
6
8
9
46
45
44
13
10
3780 4.51 34 24 -6 42 34 10
#3 Paracingulate Gyrus
9
32
1004 4.43 -2 18 42 1 29 36
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
On the other side, the process of “positive” rating in the implicit run and in the explicit run is found to be very
similar. Not surprisingly, we could not observe a statistically significant difference between both runs.
We also compared the differences between “positive” and “indifferent” ratings in both runs. There were
activations exclusive of the implicit run that reached statistical significance. These activations are listed in Table
8.
Clusters #1, #2 and #6 are found to be dorsal in the Prefrontal Cortex. Cluster #6 occupies both margins of the
Longitudinal Fissure, and clusters #1 and #2 are dorso-lateral, the former on the left and the later on the right.
Clusters #3, #4 and #5 are ventral-lateral in the Prefrontal Cortex. Cluster #3 is on the right, clusters #4 and #5
are close each other, on the left side of the brain.
8
Table 8 - Structures that have a relevant difference between rating positive versus indifferent and which
activated in the implicit run but not in the explicit.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L
L
L
L
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
9
46
620 3.52 -46 2 26 -47 13 29
#2
R
R
R
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
9
46
561 3.28 50 30 26 48 26 28
#3
R
R
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
47 466 3.23 48 44 -18 41 34 -12
#4
L
L
L
L
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
44
45
47
453 3.65 -52 18 2 -44 21 -3
#5 L Frontal Pole 10 443 3.23 -46 50 -4 -44 48 -6
#6 Paracingulate Gyrus
6
8
327 3.54 -2 38 38 0 34 36
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
4 DISCUSSION
The left Frontal Orbital Cortex participated in all ratings, wether they were “positive” or “indifferent”, and also
participated in all runs, wether implicit or explicit. Previous studies suggest that the Frontal Orbital Cortex is a
structure engaged in cultural (i.e. social relevant) transactions, allowing even individuals to distinguish between
sport cars and small cars (Erk, Spitzer, Wunderlich, Galley, & Walter, 2002). Generally, this structure is believed
to be involved in the processing of the value of reward (Walter, Abler, Ciaramidaro, & Erk, 2005), filtering
relevant cues (Kelley & Berridge, 2002; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Pelzmann, Hudnik, & Miklautz, 2005), which is
fundamental information within the social environment. Returning to the beginning of this article, to the accident
of Phineas Gage that got a lesion in his left Frontal Orbital Cortex (Damásio, 1994). Individuals who have a
lesion in this brain area are not able to represent the value of things, which renders impossible proper decisions
(Roesch, Calu, Burke, & Schoenbaum, 2007). This may explain the erratic, inconsequent and fitful behavior of
Phineas Gage, and also may explain that when individuals make assessments of commercial brands,
conscientiously or not, the left Frontal Orbital Cortex activates (Lewis, Critchley, Rotshtein, & Dolan, 2007;
Kringelbach, O'Doherty, Rolls, & Andrews, 2003).
In a previous work (yet not published), we suggested that the Frontal Medial Cortex could signal a biasing for a
preference. Although, this study denies that hypothesis. The Frontal Medial Cortex in fact signaled the positive
rated brands against the indifferent, but only in the explicit run. In the implicit run the Frontal Medial Cortex,
both activated under the positive rating as under the indifferent rating, which means that, in this case, this
structure didn’t signaled a preference. As the result of the intersection of the clusters from Table 3and from
Table 6 is an empty group, this means that this study failed to identify a structure that is capable of signaling a
preference, be within an implicit, be within an explicit run, at least within the Frontal Lobe.
However, Mitchell et al. have identified a region in the dorso-medial Prefrontal Cortex (MNI: -9, 54, 36) that is
implied in differentiating the impressions of people versus objects (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2004; Mitchell,
Macrae, & Banaji, 2005). This region activated under the positive rating within the implicit run and reached
statistical significance when compared with the indifferent rating. This means that, in the implicit run this region
differentiated positive from indifferent commercial brands. In the explicit run, both positive and indifferent
ratings were very similar, which means that there aren’t structures that are able to separate a preference. Maybe
the particularities of the explicit run, very formal and straight forward, led the participants to use the same
rational scheme and preferences are disguised. In this case the implicit run should be more close to everyday life
and preferences are assumed in a process distant from the used in the explicit run, away from strict and
formatting instructions that should be obeyed. Making the parallel with the studies of Mitchell et al., this region
of the Frontal Pole should be responsible for individuals to consider positive rated commercial brands more close
9
to persons than mere objects. This has special relevance, as may bring evidence to the social content that
commercial brands should have, at least those that each individual rates as positive.
When an individual makes inferences about the mental states of others, he is mentalizing. This is one of the
processes of the Theory of Mind – ToM (Adolphs R. , 2001; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen,
2004; Saxe, 2006; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). The Paracingulate Gyrus, another structure that was activated
throughout all valence assessments in the explicit run and in the “positive” rating within the implicit run, was
also found to activate when the process of mentalizing occurs (referencia?). Within the theory of Symbolic
Interactionism (Ligas & Cotte, 1999) the value of a brand is asserted within the social group. The Symbolic
Interactionism is a complex play between the social action, the self-reflexive nature of the individual and the
negotiation of each one’s self-concept within the social context. As so, Theory of Mind plays a crucial role,
because each individual, during the transactional process, must infer the mental states (beliefs, aims, intentions,
strategies…) of his peers. The activation of the Paracingulate Gyrus suggests that participants had already played
this “game” before hand, and that each brand had a previous quotation and meaning to the individual. However,
we found a difference between the explicit and the implicit run. In the explicit run both ratings, “positive” and
‘indifferent’, activated the Paracingulate Gyrus. This means that, when making conscientious assessments,
participants always used the Paracingulate Gyrus to evoke the mentalizing process, which seems logical as they
were identifying the emotional and social value of each brand. In the implicit run this process was evoked only
when participants saw stimuli that they considered “positive”. It seems that the process of evoking the
mentalizing process occurs after other processes. If this is the case, mentalizing could be evoked by
conscientious volition or, if uncousciously, it could be only evoked under “positive” arousal. These speculations
address the theme of subliminal messages used in Marketing. It suggests that, if there was not a previous
acceptance of the message’s emotional and social content, it may be not considered by the individual, unless he
brings it to a conscientious state, which, in turn, would kill the subliminal effect. Further studies, with paradigms
that specifically address this problem should be conducted in the future.
The Inferior Frontal Gyrus is a structure composed by two subregions named Pars Opercularis and Pars
Triangularis. In the left hemisphere, these structures correspond to what is known as Broca’s area, a region
fundamental for language processing (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; Matthews, et al., 2003). Intriguingly, the
contrast words used didn’t have an emotional content and neither suggested objects nor actions. As so, nonemotional
language areas shouldn’t contrast and, therefore shouldn’t produce any activation, although language
processing is complex and a long way from being completely understood. In the implicit run both left and right
Inferior Frontal Gyrus activated under “positive” rating, but did not acivate under “indifferent" rating, reaching
statistical significance. In the explicit run, there was activation in both ratings. The Pars Opercularis and the Pars
Triangularis in both hemispheres had a behavior identical to the Paracingulate Gyrus. All these activations and
behavior may suggest that there can exist other explanations (to?), and that these should be investigated. One
possible hypothesis is that mirror neurons may exist within these areas (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti,
2005). It is believed today that the role of the mirror neurons is far more complex than just mirroring actions of
other individuals. They are supposed to have an important role in language, imitation and emotions (Carr,
Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004). Individuals with Autism are
known to have severe impairments in social tasks. These individuals have great difficulty in learning social
meanings by the process of imitating, probably due to a dysfunctional mirror neuron system inside the Pars
Opercularis (Dapretto, et al., 2006). As the reading process should have been canceled due to the lack of contrast
between stimulus and baseline in our experiment, and still we could find activations in these areas, it can be
hypothesized that brands are symbols that humans can use for imitation (very important in social behavior
learning) or for emotion decoding. Further investigation, with paradigms more sensible for this concern, should
confirm or not this trend.
On the other hand, both left and right Inferior Frontal Gyrus were found to encode for differences when
individuals form impressions of persons and objects. Like the dorso-medial Prefrontal Cortex, the Inferior
Frontal Gyrus is also a candidate to specifically index “(…) the social-cognitive aspects of impression formation
(i.e., understanding the psychological characteristics of another mental agent)” (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji,
2005). Supposing that commercial brands have social relevant content, then each individual could use this
information to infer about the characteristics of his peers (Adolphs R. , 2003). To extract the brand social load,
the individual could use the mirror neurons that are possibly present in the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (Rizzolatti &
Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti, 2005). This special neurons mirror the behavior of the peers, transferring to the
individual the social meanings of the symbols (Critchley, et al., 2000) by a process of imitation. This argument
escorts us again to the theory of Symbolic Interactionism (Ligas & Cotte, 1999). In conclusion, there is a close
link between the Inferior Frontal Gyrus, mirroring / imitating, Symbolic Interactionism, the Theory of Mind /
10
mentalizing, and the Paracingulate Gyrus, from where the brand social value, that is, Brand Equity, should be
determined.
5 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank to Professor Isabel Ramos the support for the use of the MRI scanner.
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MARKETING
NEUROMARKETING: HOW NEUROSCIENCE CAN HELP GET INTO THE
MINDS OF THE CONSUMERS. A STUDY ON COMMERCIAL BRANDS.
José Paulo Neves Correia Marques dos Santos, jpsantos@ismai.pt, Investigation Unit in Human
Development and Psychology (Unidep), ISMAI - Superior Institute of Maia, Portugal / Applied
Economy Department II, Economy Faculty, Coruña University, A Coruña, Spain
Fernanda Sofia Quintela da Silva Brandão, sofiabrandao@netcabo.pt, Radiology Department,
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Unit, São João Hospital, Oporto, Portugal
Daniela Vasconcelos Ribeiro Santos Seixas, dseixas@med.up.pt, Institute of Histology and
Embryology, Faculty of Medicine, Oporto University, Portugal / Neuroradiology Department of São
João Hospital, Oporto, Portugal
1
MARKETING
NEUROMARKETING: HOW NEUROSCIENCE CAN HELP GET INTO THE
MINDS OF THE CONSUMERS. A STUDY ON COMMERCIAL BRANDS.
José Paulo Neves Correia Marques dos Santos, jpsantos@ismai.pt, Investigation Unit in Human
Development and Psychology (Unidep), ISMAI - Superior Institute of Maia, Portugal / Applied
Economy Department II, Economy Faculty, Coruña University, A Coruña, Spain
Fernanda Sofia Quintela da Silva Brandão, sofiabrandao@netcabo.pt, Radiology Department,
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Unit, São João Hospital, Oporto, Portugal
Daniela Vasconcelos Ribeiro Santos Seixas, dseixas@med.up.pt, Institute of Histology and
Embryology, Faculty of Medicine, Oporto University, Portugal / Neuroradiology Department of São
João Hospital, Oporto, Portugal
ABSTRACT
An evolutionary perspective suggests that the Frontal Lobe in the brain had an important role in
constructing the actual human social groups. Broca’s area, inside the Frontal Lobe, contributes to the
language and reading processes. Looking to History, it is possible to make a parallel between the first
ideograms and the commercial brands’ logos of the present. The parallel could be prolonged and the
reading act and the logos interpretation could share similar processes within the Frontal Lobe. On the
other hand, Neuroscience suggests that the Frontal Lobe may be the place where other social cognitive
capabilities take place, as for example mentalizing, future planning or decision-making. All these
considerations about the Frontal Lobe led to the present work. We idealized a paradigm to investigate
how the human brain reads, interprets and uses the symbols and the meaning of commercial brands,
using Functional Magnetic Resonance.
Key words: Neuromarketing, Commercial brands, Frontal Lobe, Emotions, Social Brain.
1 INTRODUCTION
The accident of Phineas Gage occurred in September 13, 1848, may still have consequences today within the
Marketing discipline. Phineas Gage was working with explosives in a railway construction when an accidental
explosion projected the tamping iron that he was using. The tamping iron penetrated his head, in a bottom to top
direction, entering in the left cheekbone and exiting by the top-left part of the frontal bone. Surprisingly, Phineas
Gage survived, although with severe damage of the left section of his Frontal Lobe (Ratiu, Talos, Haker,
Lieberman, & Everett, 2004). He didn’t lose most of his normal capabilities: he continued to be able to maintain
a conversation, his movements were not impaired, and inclusively he managed to go back to work. But, as
reported by his doctor and colleagues, he wasn’t the same Phineas: now he was irreverent, indifferent about his
fellows, gross, indulgent, and remarkably fitful and inconsequent. These cues led António Damásio and coworkers
to hypothesize that the Frontal Lobe could be important for mood and emotion and then to decisionmaking
and future planning (Damásio, 1994).
In an evolutionary perspective, it is widely accepted that there was a tremendous growth of the brain during
evolution to Homo sapiens sapiens, most particularly in the Homo lineage. Analyzing separately the evolution of
the different brain lobes, it was the Frontal Lobe that registered the biggest proportional enlargement (Holloway,
1995; Bruner, Manzi, & Arsuaga, 2003; Burns, 2006). Took in consideration alone, this fact does not prove
anything, but, together with neurological examples like the case of Phineas Gage, it provides cues for
investigating the special development of the species Homo sapiens sapiens. There is then a non-negligible
probability that the Frontal Lobe lies behind the social complexity of the Homo sapiens sapiens.
2
The large and complex social groups of the species Homo sapiens sapiens use symbols and signs to
communicate. Some of these signs and symbols evolved into a knowledge known as writing (Pinker, 1995). The
first utilized symbols were ideograms, which are graphic symbols that, by themselves, represent an idea.
Ideograms were used within the earlier logographic writing systems, as the hieroglyphs in old Egyptian.
However, in eastern Asia, logographic writing systems are still are used, namely the traditional Chinese system
(Tan, et al., 2000). Not surprisingly, the act of reading induces activations in several regions in the brain, and in
particular in a region of the Frontal Lobe known as Broca’s area (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; Matthews, et al.,
2003). Commonalities in brain activations are also found between words and pictures (Vandenberghe, Price,
Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996). Considering these arguments, there is an evident link between the
development of the Homo lineage, the growth of the Frontal Lobe and the invention of writing and reading
meaningful symbols.
A special class of these meaningful symbols that are used within social context makes the bridging to the
Marketing discipline: commercial brands. The parallel between commercial brands and the first ideograms is
conspicuous: both are graphical representations that embody an idea. To understand how consumers read,
interpret and use these symbols, the commercial brands, the Frontal Lobe should be minutely inquired. This is
the main goal of the present work.
When individuals make social transactions, they usually do not use rational, full cognitive, conscientious and
explicit strategies. By the contrary, individuals tend to utilize implicit automated, ready-made short-cuts
(Pelzmann, Hudnik, & Miklautz, 2005). If it was not like this, the so complex social processing would quickly
overflow any individual processing capacity, which could paralyze the human system. Again in an evolutionary
perspective, this transformation probably happened early in evolution, If it was not, the case human beings might
not have survived until the present day, as they would have been easy targets for predators. So, is likely that
humans mostly act by implicit rather than explicit strategies within the social context, i.e. without full cognitive
awareness (Critchley, et al., 2000). In spite of this, most of the studies that investigate the brain use explicit
paradigms, for example to form impressions of people and objects (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2004; Mitchell,
Macrae, & Banaji, 2005), or other social research problems (Adolphs R. , 2003). But is this how people form
impressions of others or objects? Common experience shows that individuals form impressions of their peers
implicitly, and implicitly use this information when trading (Critchley, et al., 2000). Our objectives were to
investigate these issues, focusing in the Frontal Lobe in particular, and also attempt to determinate if explicit or
implicit processing of commercial brands is in fact different.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) has emerged in the last decade as the preferred technique in
Social Neuroscience studies. Contrary to other techniques used in Neuroscience research in humans, fMRI is
non-invasive, which means that the risks inherent to this technique are minimal (Huettel, Song, & McCarthy,
2004). FMRI does not use either ionizing radiation or chemical substances. FMRI employs strong magnetic
field, which, to date, albeit the millions of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans that are made every day,
never was connected with any kind of detrimental long term effects. FMRI has a good spatial resolution (up to 1
mm), which means that it is able to image the individualized structures that compose the brain are and it allows
to differentiate which ones are active and which ones are not active during the performance of a certain task.
FMRI relies on the response of the blood vessels that follows brain electrical activity, and as such its temporal
resolution is not excellent, but at least identical to other popular neuroimaging methods like Positron Emission
Tomography (PET). Other relative disadvantages are the physical noise (much attenuated with the use of
auricular protection), the more or less long data acquisitions and the artificial research environment, away from
the reality of everyday life. Considering fMRI’s advantages and disadvantages, it is actually one of the best
imaging methods to innocuously visualize brain function in humans in vivo. Original articles using fMRI as a
methodology have been growing in numbers each year in the worldwide scientific literature, especially in the
field of cognitive neuroscience, which will be also the core of the present study.
2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 Participants
The participants were 6 healthy male and 6 healthy female volunteers, right handed, native Portuguese speakers
with neither history of neurological nor psychiatric disturbances (mean age 28,4 years, 5,4 s. d.; mean schooling
16,2 years, 1,5 s. d.). Informed consent was obtained in all cases. A safety form for MRI was filled by every
participant and discussed with a Neuroradiologist and a Radiographer. This research project was approved by the
Ethics Committee of São João Hospital, Oporto, Portugal.
3
2.2 Behavioral procedures
To explore our hypothesis, we designed a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) task that encompassed
commercial brands as stimulus, made-up by two paradigms (runs).
In the first run (implicit) volunteers were only instructed to look at the screen during the scanning; nothing was
said regarding what they are about to see (commercial brands). Then, in the explicit run, we instructed the
volunteers to make mental assessments of the brands they would see. The order of the runs was crucial: being
first the implicit task, we expected to capture the volunteers’ free will and avoid any anticipation.
The paradigm was the same for both runs and consisted of a mixed design experiment – block and event-related
– where as baseline we used words without emotional content, over a black background. These words were
determiners, conjunctions, prepositions or adverbs. Importantly, we didn’t use any nouns or verbs that could
evoke emotions, objects or actions. As stimulus, we employed commercial brands, with the logos and colors that
were characteristic for each and every one in everyday life. The baseline period was equal to the stimulus period,
30 seconds long. Within each 30 seconds period, 5 slides were visually displayed, 6 seconds each. The slide set
was then composed by 16 baseline periods and 16 stimulus periods, totaling 160 slides.
For the selection of the commercial brands to use as stimulus, 147 students of the Superior Institute of Maia
(ISMAI), Portugal, filled in an inquiry with 237 commercial brands. The purpose of this inquiry was to decide on
the most well known brands. The brands supposedly with emotional content (chosen by the students either with a
“negative” or a “positive” valence) were intermingled pseudo-randomly with the brands with supposedly nonemotional
content (those that received an assessment of “indifferent”).
Between the MRI scanning runs, the volunteers filled in an inquiry that had the exactly same sequence of
commercial brands that was within the slide set they were about to visualize inside the MRI scanner. For each
brand, the volunteers chose between four states: “unknown”, “negative”, “indifferent”, and “positive”. In this
way, before the explicit run, they trained the brands’ assessments which were then required to be repeated
through the scanning session. These inquiries were used afterwards to construct the basic shapes for the eventrelated
analysis.
2.3 Image acquisition
A whole brain anatomical structural scan was acquired for each volunteer in a Siemens® Trio high field (3 Tesla)
MRI scanner, using a T1-weighted MPRAGE protocol (256 x 256 matrix, FOV = 256 mm, 3.0 mm axial slices).
Functional images were acquired using T2*-weighted EPI (TR = 3000 ms, TE = 30 ms, 64 x 64 matrix, FOV =
192 mm, 3.0 mm axial slices). Gradient field mapping was additionally acquired for image quality control.
A trained Neuroradiologist reviewed all the anatomical scans. No incidental findings were found.
2.4 Image analysis
FMRI data processing was carried out using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 5.90, part of FSL
(FMRIB's Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl).
The following pre-statistics processing was applied; motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister,
Brady, & Smith, 2002); slice-timing correction using Fourier-space time-series phase-shifting; non-brain
removal using BET (Smith, 2002); spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 5mm; grand-mean
intensity normalization of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor; highpass temporal filtering
(Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma=30.0s). Time-series statistical analysis was
carried out using FILM with local autocorrelation correction (Woolrich, Ripley, Brady, & Smith, 2001).
Registration to high resolution structural and/or standard space images was carried out using FLIRT (Jenkinson
& Smith, 2001; Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002).
Higher-level analysis was carried out using FLAME (FMRIB's Local Analysis of Mixed Effects) stage 1 only,
i.e., without the final MCMC-based stage (Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2003; Woolrich, Behrens,
Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2004).
Z (Gaussianised T/F) statistic images were thresholded using clusters determined by Z>2.3 and a (corrected)
cluster significance threshold of P=0.05 (Worsley, 2001).
4
Interesting structures were isolated using ROIs - Region-of-Interest. The masks to pre-threshold the ROIs were
made based on the atlases “Harvard-Oxford Cortical Structural Atlas” and “Harvard-Oxford Subcortical
Structural Atlas” which accompany FSL View v3.0, part of FSL 4.0.
3 RESULTS
Along the scans, the twelve participants made implicit and then explicit cognitive assessments of commercial
brands. Four possible valences were available for the explicit assessments: “unknown”, “negative”, “indifferent”,
and “positive”. As the aim of this work is to understand how the Frontal Lobe distinguishes between indifferent
commercial brands from those that induce preferences, only the ratings “indifferent” and “positive” were
considered for analysis.
In Table 1 and Table 2 are listed the results of the activations, respectively produced under positive and
indifferent rating, within the implicit run. In Table 1, from the dorsal to the ventral Front Lobe, the biggest
cluster (#1) occupies the margins of the Longitudinal Fissure, starting in the Juxtapositional Lobule Cortex and
descending until the Frontal Medial Cortex, in the base of the brain. Here, it “spreads”, laterally and medially to
the Frontal Orbital Cortex (the left is larger) and rostrally to the Subcallosal Cortex. The cluster #2 and the
clusters #3 and #4 are almost mirrored. They occupy the dorso-lateral sections of the Frontal Lobe.
Table 1 – Brain structures activated under positive rating, within the implicit run.
z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
BA
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L/R
Juxtapositional Lobule Cortex
Paracingulate Gyrus
Superior Frontal Gyrus
Frontal Pole
Frontal Medial Cortex
Subcallosal Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
6
8
9
10
11
25
47
6767 5.20 -28 28 22 -10 40 6
#2
R
R
R
R
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
6
46
44
973 3.72 38 32 10 41 12 31
#3
L
L
L
L
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
6
46
44
929 3.67 -50 28 18 -44 15 22
#4 L Middle Frontal Gyrus 8 320 3.78 -28 24 48 -34 18 43
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
In Table 2, the most dorsal cluster (#1), occupies the left margin of the Longitudinal Fissure. Clusters #2 and #3
occupy the ventral brain, the former in both sides of the Longitudinal Fissure and the later laterally on the left
side.
Table 2 – Brain structures activated under indifferent rating, within the implicit run.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
Frontal Pole
Frontal Medial Cortex
Subcallosal Cortex
10
25
481 3.65 -4 52 -18 -3 45 -18
#2 L Frontal Pole 9 331 4.06 -8 68 26 -9 64 25
#3 L Frontal Orbital Cortex 47 301 4.19 -28 32 -18 -31 32 -18
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
5
Comparing Table 1 and Table 2, it is possible to verify that there are common activated structures. It is the case
of Frontal Medial Cortex / Subcallosal Cortex and the left Frontal Orbital Cortex, all in the dorsal portion of the
Prefrontal Cortex. In the ventral but still anterior section of the Prefrontal Cortex, it shares a common part of the
Frontal Pole.
In Table 3 are listed the clusters that are statistically significant when differences between the ratings positive
and indifferent are made, within the implicit run. From the dorsal to the ventral Front Lobe, the biggest cluster
(#1) occupies the left margin of the Longitudinal Fissure, starting in the Precentral Gyrus and descending, by two
separated branches, one until the Frontal Orbital Cortex, and the other until the Pars Opercularis. Cluster #2
occupies the dorso-lateral part of the Prefrontal Cortex.
Table 3 - Brain structures that activated under positive rating but not at indifferent, within the implicit
run.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Frontal Pole
Paracingulate Gyrus
Superior Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Orbital Cortex
6
8
32
9
46
10
47
3649 3.52 -48 4 26 -30 33 22
#2
R
R
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Pole
46
47
11
480 3.45 40 38 -12 44 35 -8
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
Of special relevance, we verified that the left Frontal Orbital Cortex had a region of activation common to both
“positive” and “indifferent” ratings (its rostral area) and another one exclusive to the “positive’ rating (its
anterior area). Activations also exclusive of the “positive” rating were the Paracingulate Cortex and the Inferior
Frontal Gyrus, both its Pars Opercularis and Pars Triangularis.
There were no clusters with statistical significance that activated exclusively in the “indifferent” rating, still
considering the implicit run.
In the explicit run the participants made conscious, explicit, assessments of the commercial brands, which were
previously trained outside the scanner room.
Table 4 and Table 5 list, respectively, the results of “positive” and “indifferent” ratings obtained in the explicit
run. It can be observed in Table 4 that Cluster #1 is composed by two separated branches that involve the ventral
Prefrontal Cortex and the dorsal-frontal-lateral brain, where they weld. One branch that occupies the
Juxtapositional Lobule Cortex and “descends” along the Longitudinal Fissure and then “bends” laterally, until
the ventro-lateral Frontal Pole. The other branch involves the Precentral Gyrus and then the Frontal Orbital
Cortex, where it welds with the first branch. Clusters #2 and #3 are in the right hemisphere in a lateral position,
being cluster #2 more dorsal and cluster #3 more ventral.
In Table 5, Cluster #1 is observed as a complex activation area, composed by two branches (like a V) that
involves the frontal-lateral section of the Prefrontal Cortex, and left hemisphere, and welds dorsally in the
Frontal Orbital Cortex. Cluster #2 is similar to cluster #1, with the difference that it is in the opposite
hemisphere. Cluster #3 occupies the margins of the Longitudinal Fissure in the Paracingulate Cortex.
Comparing Table 4 with Table 5, we verified that the clusters found were very similar, almost superimposing.
This is the case of the Paracingulate Cortex, the left and right Inferior Frontal Gyrus (both the Pars Opercularis
and the Pars Triangularis), the Frontal Operculum and the Frontal Orbital Cortex.
6
Table 4 - Brain structures activated under positive rating, within the explicit run.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
Juxtapositional Lobule Cortex
Paracingulate Gyrus
Superior Frontal Gyrus
Frontal Pole
Frontal Medial Cortex
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
6
8
9
10
11
47
46
13
45
7905 4.62 -42 48 -10 -30 30 13
#2
R
R
R
R
R
Precentral Gyrus
Middle frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Pole
6
9
10
1242 3.90 38 34 12 44 13 31
#3
R
R
R
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
13
10
1068 3.86 30 38 -14 34 36 -10
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
Table 5 - Brain structures activated under indifferent rating within the explicit run.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
6
8
9
46
45
44
13
10
6180 4.99 -46 52 -10 -41 29 10
#2
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
6
8
9
46
45
44
13
10
3573 5.17 32 28 -8 42 30 12
#3 Paracingulate Gyrus
9
32
1158 5.15 -4 18 44 0 28 36
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
In Table 6Table 3 is listed the cluster that is statistically significant when differences between the ratings
“positive” and “indifferent” are considered, within the explicit run. This cluster occupies the ventral-medial
margins of the Longitudinal Fissure.
There were no statistically significant activated clusters exclusive of the “indifferent” rating within the explicit
run.
7
Table 6 - Brain structures that activated under positive rating but not at indifferent, within the explicit
run.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
Frontal Pole
Paracingulate Gyrus
Frontal Medial Cortex
10 341 3.25 -4 56 0 -4 49 -8
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
Comparing the “indifferent” ratings in both runs, implicit and explicit, we observed that clusters #2 and #3
(Table 2) share most of their voxels, i.e. the dorsal part of the Frontal Pole and the anterior part of left Frontal
Orbital Cortex. Besides these common areas, almost all the other activations identified in the explicit run and in
the implicit run are not found to have any correspondence between them (Table 7).
Table 7 - Brain structures that activated in the explicit run but not in the implicit, within the indifferent
rating.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
6
8
9
46
45
44
13
10
4942 4.40 -40 22 -10 -43 28 11
#2
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
6
8
9
46
45
44
13
10
3780 4.51 34 24 -6 42 34 10
#3 Paracingulate Gyrus
9
32
1004 4.43 -2 18 42 1 29 36
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
On the other side, the process of “positive” rating in the implicit run and in the explicit run is found to be very
similar. Not surprisingly, we could not observe a statistically significant difference between both runs.
We also compared the differences between “positive” and “indifferent” ratings in both runs. There were
activations exclusive of the implicit run that reached statistical significance. These activations are listed in Table
8.
Clusters #1, #2 and #6 are found to be dorsal in the Prefrontal Cortex. Cluster #6 occupies both margins of the
Longitudinal Fissure, and clusters #1 and #2 are dorso-lateral, the former on the left and the later on the right.
Clusters #3, #4 and #5 are ventral-lateral in the Prefrontal Cortex. Cluster #3 is on the right, clusters #4 and #5
are close each other, on the left side of the brain.
8
Table 8 - Structures that have a relevant difference between rating positive versus indifferent and which
activated in the implicit run but not in the explicit.
BA z max Center of gravity
#
(1)
Brain structures contained by the cluster
(2)
Cluster
voxels z X Y Z X Y Z
#1
L
L
L
L
Precentral Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
9
46
620 3.52 -46 2 26 -47 13 29
#2
R
R
R
Middle Frontal Gyrus
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
9
46
561 3.28 50 30 26 48 26 28
#3
R
R
Frontal Orbital Cortex
Frontal Pole
47 466 3.23 48 44 -18 41 34 -12
#4
L
L
L
L
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Opercularis
Inferior Frontal Gyrus – Pars Triangularis
Frontal Operculum Cortex
Frontal Orbital Cortex
44
45
47
453 3.65 -52 18 2 -44 21 -3
#5 L Frontal Pole 10 443 3.23 -46 50 -4 -44 48 -6
#6 Paracingulate Gyrus
6
8
327 3.54 -2 38 38 0 34 36
All the coordinates are MNI152.
(1) L – left; R – right
(2) BA – Brodmann Areas
4 DISCUSSION
The left Frontal Orbital Cortex participated in all ratings, wether they were “positive” or “indifferent”, and also
participated in all runs, wether implicit or explicit. Previous studies suggest that the Frontal Orbital Cortex is a
structure engaged in cultural (i.e. social relevant) transactions, allowing even individuals to distinguish between
sport cars and small cars (Erk, Spitzer, Wunderlich, Galley, & Walter, 2002). Generally, this structure is believed
to be involved in the processing of the value of reward (Walter, Abler, Ciaramidaro, & Erk, 2005), filtering
relevant cues (Kelley & Berridge, 2002; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Pelzmann, Hudnik, & Miklautz, 2005), which is
fundamental information within the social environment. Returning to the beginning of this article, to the accident
of Phineas Gage that got a lesion in his left Frontal Orbital Cortex (Damásio, 1994). Individuals who have a
lesion in this brain area are not able to represent the value of things, which renders impossible proper decisions
(Roesch, Calu, Burke, & Schoenbaum, 2007). This may explain the erratic, inconsequent and fitful behavior of
Phineas Gage, and also may explain that when individuals make assessments of commercial brands,
conscientiously or not, the left Frontal Orbital Cortex activates (Lewis, Critchley, Rotshtein, & Dolan, 2007;
Kringelbach, O'Doherty, Rolls, & Andrews, 2003).
In a previous work (yet not published), we suggested that the Frontal Medial Cortex could signal a biasing for a
preference. Although, this study denies that hypothesis. The Frontal Medial Cortex in fact signaled the positive
rated brands against the indifferent, but only in the explicit run. In the implicit run the Frontal Medial Cortex,
both activated under the positive rating as under the indifferent rating, which means that, in this case, this
structure didn’t signaled a preference. As the result of the intersection of the clusters from Table 3and from
Table 6 is an empty group, this means that this study failed to identify a structure that is capable of signaling a
preference, be within an implicit, be within an explicit run, at least within the Frontal Lobe.
However, Mitchell et al. have identified a region in the dorso-medial Prefrontal Cortex (MNI: -9, 54, 36) that is
implied in differentiating the impressions of people versus objects (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2004; Mitchell,
Macrae, & Banaji, 2005). This region activated under the positive rating within the implicit run and reached
statistical significance when compared with the indifferent rating. This means that, in the implicit run this region
differentiated positive from indifferent commercial brands. In the explicit run, both positive and indifferent
ratings were very similar, which means that there aren’t structures that are able to separate a preference. Maybe
the particularities of the explicit run, very formal and straight forward, led the participants to use the same
rational scheme and preferences are disguised. In this case the implicit run should be more close to everyday life
and preferences are assumed in a process distant from the used in the explicit run, away from strict and
formatting instructions that should be obeyed. Making the parallel with the studies of Mitchell et al., this region
of the Frontal Pole should be responsible for individuals to consider positive rated commercial brands more close
9
to persons than mere objects. This has special relevance, as may bring evidence to the social content that
commercial brands should have, at least those that each individual rates as positive.
When an individual makes inferences about the mental states of others, he is mentalizing. This is one of the
processes of the Theory of Mind – ToM (Adolphs R. , 2001; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen,
2004; Saxe, 2006; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). The Paracingulate Gyrus, another structure that was activated
throughout all valence assessments in the explicit run and in the “positive” rating within the implicit run, was
also found to activate when the process of mentalizing occurs (referencia?). Within the theory of Symbolic
Interactionism (Ligas & Cotte, 1999) the value of a brand is asserted within the social group. The Symbolic
Interactionism is a complex play between the social action, the self-reflexive nature of the individual and the
negotiation of each one’s self-concept within the social context. As so, Theory of Mind plays a crucial role,
because each individual, during the transactional process, must infer the mental states (beliefs, aims, intentions,
strategies…) of his peers. The activation of the Paracingulate Gyrus suggests that participants had already played
this “game” before hand, and that each brand had a previous quotation and meaning to the individual. However,
we found a difference between the explicit and the implicit run. In the explicit run both ratings, “positive” and
‘indifferent’, activated the Paracingulate Gyrus. This means that, when making conscientious assessments,
participants always used the Paracingulate Gyrus to evoke the mentalizing process, which seems logical as they
were identifying the emotional and social value of each brand. In the implicit run this process was evoked only
when participants saw stimuli that they considered “positive”. It seems that the process of evoking the
mentalizing process occurs after other processes. If this is the case, mentalizing could be evoked by
conscientious volition or, if uncousciously, it could be only evoked under “positive” arousal. These speculations
address the theme of subliminal messages used in Marketing. It suggests that, if there was not a previous
acceptance of the message’s emotional and social content, it may be not considered by the individual, unless he
brings it to a conscientious state, which, in turn, would kill the subliminal effect. Further studies, with paradigms
that specifically address this problem should be conducted in the future.
The Inferior Frontal Gyrus is a structure composed by two subregions named Pars Opercularis and Pars
Triangularis. In the left hemisphere, these structures correspond to what is known as Broca’s area, a region
fundamental for language processing (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; Matthews, et al., 2003). Intriguingly, the
contrast words used didn’t have an emotional content and neither suggested objects nor actions. As so, nonemotional
language areas shouldn’t contrast and, therefore shouldn’t produce any activation, although language
processing is complex and a long way from being completely understood. In the implicit run both left and right
Inferior Frontal Gyrus activated under “positive” rating, but did not acivate under “indifferent" rating, reaching
statistical significance. In the explicit run, there was activation in both ratings. The Pars Opercularis and the Pars
Triangularis in both hemispheres had a behavior identical to the Paracingulate Gyrus. All these activations and
behavior may suggest that there can exist other explanations (to?), and that these should be investigated. One
possible hypothesis is that mirror neurons may exist within these areas (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti,
2005). It is believed today that the role of the mirror neurons is far more complex than just mirroring actions of
other individuals. They are supposed to have an important role in language, imitation and emotions (Carr,
Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004). Individuals with Autism are
known to have severe impairments in social tasks. These individuals have great difficulty in learning social
meanings by the process of imitating, probably due to a dysfunctional mirror neuron system inside the Pars
Opercularis (Dapretto, et al., 2006). As the reading process should have been canceled due to the lack of contrast
between stimulus and baseline in our experiment, and still we could find activations in these areas, it can be
hypothesized that brands are symbols that humans can use for imitation (very important in social behavior
learning) or for emotion decoding. Further investigation, with paradigms more sensible for this concern, should
confirm or not this trend.
On the other hand, both left and right Inferior Frontal Gyrus were found to encode for differences when
individuals form impressions of persons and objects. Like the dorso-medial Prefrontal Cortex, the Inferior
Frontal Gyrus is also a candidate to specifically index “(…) the social-cognitive aspects of impression formation
(i.e., understanding the psychological characteristics of another mental agent)” (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji,
2005). Supposing that commercial brands have social relevant content, then each individual could use this
information to infer about the characteristics of his peers (Adolphs R. , 2003). To extract the brand social load,
the individual could use the mirror neurons that are possibly present in the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (Rizzolatti &
Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti, 2005). This special neurons mirror the behavior of the peers, transferring to the
individual the social meanings of the symbols (Critchley, et al., 2000) by a process of imitation. This argument
escorts us again to the theory of Symbolic Interactionism (Ligas & Cotte, 1999). In conclusion, there is a close
link between the Inferior Frontal Gyrus, mirroring / imitating, Symbolic Interactionism, the Theory of Mind /
10
mentalizing, and the Paracingulate Gyrus, from where the brand social value, that is, Brand Equity, should be
determined.
5 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank to Professor Isabel Ramos the support for the use of the MRI scanner.
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